THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN ABOLISHING
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

T HE abolition of the governmental

immunity doctrine has been
urged since before the turn of the century.' Until recently, however,
courts have refused to give tort relief in the absence of legislation or
facts on which the immunity doctrine could be circumvented. Since
governmental enterprises continue to expand in scope at an ever
increasing rate, their contact with and influence on the individual
becomes more significant. Therefore, the unpredictable and often
inequitable consequences resulting from the "governmental-pro.
prietary" dichotomy,2 "discretionary-ministerial" distinction and
1

"[I]f they [municipal corporations] by their neglect of duty inflict injury on any
one they should be held liable for it. To establish this rule is the only way to enforce
diligence." Young, Liability of Municipal Corporationsfor Negligence, 18 AM. L. REv.
1008, 1018 (1884). In the late nineteenth century, another noted authority criticized
tort immunity of public entities as being unjustified on public policy grounds.
GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE 106, 180-82 (1916). However, widespread comment
was not generated until the publication of a series of eight articles by Professor Edwin
M. Borchard in the 1920's. See, e.g., Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3),
34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925); Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort,
vi, 36 YALE L.J. 1039 (1927); Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, 28 COLUM. L. R v. 734 (1928). For a discussion of the writings of Goodnow and
Borchard, as well as those of other early advocates of governmental responsibility, see
Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability,
9 LAW, & CONTEMP. PRon. 214-18 (1942). In recent years, academic commentary has
been overwhelmingly directed against governmental immunity on grounds of history,
comparative law and policy. See 2 HARPER & JAMFS, TORTs § 29.4, at 1617 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]. For an excellent, though somewhat out of date, symposium, see Governmental Tort Liability, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 179 (1942). See
generally Governmental Tort Symposium, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1321 (1954); James, Tort
Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 610 (1955);
Comment, 26 GA. B.J. 435 (1964).
2 The rationale behind the "governmental-proprietary" dichotomy is that when a
public entity is involved in a governmental function, it is acting as the arm of the state
and is, therefore, immune from tort liability; but, when involved in a proprietary
function it is devoid of the cloak of immunity. 2 HARPER & JAMES § 29.5, at 1620.
Because of the confusion this dichotomy has caused among and within jurisdictions, it
has been attacked as being one of the most unsatisfactory distinctions known to the
law. 3 DAvis, ADmNISTRATIVE LAW § 25.07, at 460 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvIs].
It has generally been assumed that all state activities, as distinguished from activities of political subdivisions, are immune. 81 CJ.S. States § 130 (1953); 52 AM. JUR.
Torts § 100 (1944). However, California and Texas are at least two states in which
the "governmental-proprietary" distinction has been extended to state functions.
See Pianka v. State, 46 Cal. 2d 208, 292 P.2d 458 (1956); State v. Elliott, 212 S.W. 695
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919); CAL. LAW REviS1oN COMM'N, A STUDY RELATING TO SOVEREIGN
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other judicial attempts4 to designate areas of governmental tort
liability and immunity have been increasingly lamented from the
13 n.2 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY]; 81 C.J.S.
States § 130 nn.76 & 77 (1953). Political subdivisions of the state, such as counties imd
townships, have generally been considered immune as an arm of the state, but in
some cases have been held to exercise proprietary functions. See 2 HARPER & JAMES
§ 29.5; 14 AI. JUR. Counties § 48 (1938); 20 C.J.S. Counties § 215 (1940); Note, The
Decline of Sovereign Immunity in Indiana, 36 IND. L.J. 223, 230 (1961).
No satisfactory test having been devised to distinguish governmental from pro:prietary functions, the distinction should be discarded as unjust and unpredictable'.
See 2 HARPER & JAMES § 29.6, at 1621; SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 224; 26-27 NACCA L.J.
31, 37-38 (1960-61). But the patchwork of decisions may suggest underlying policy
considerations which could be helpful in determing areas of governmental liability.
See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 224-25.
3The "discretionary-ministerial" distinction is based on the premise that if the
wrong was committed in the course of an activity involving discretion of a judicial or
legislative nature, no liability will be imposed; but if the activity is merely a ministerial function, not involving personal judgment, liability may be imposed. Repko,
supra note 1, at 222. The reason that governmental entities and their employees are
given immunity from tort liability in carrying out discretionary functions is that public
interests are better served by allowing decisions to be made without the fear of possible tort liability. See notes 38 & 39 infra. In practice the distinction has operated
to limit the area of liability permitted by the "governmental-proprietary" dichotomy.
Repko, supra note 1, at 223. It is generally agreed that immunity is needed for some
discretionary functions. See notes 37 & 38 infra. For a discussion on the related
exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act and the confusion it has caused, see 3 DAvIs
§§ 25.08-.10.
' New Jersey's unique "active wrongdoing" test is another example of a confusing attempt to circumvent governmental immunity. See Repko, supra note 1, at 223-24;
Rosenberg, The Decline of Municipal Tort Immunity, 5 CURRENT MUNICIPAL PROBLEMS
47, 49-59 (1963). The part of this rule which limited the liability of a municipality
for negligent acts of commission to instances where the wrongdoer occupied such a
position of authority as to hold the municipality itself responsible as a participant
has been recognized as an anomaly and discarded by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 192, 162 A.2d 820, 831 (1960). Therefore, the
general principles of vicarious liability apply, but only where negligent acts of commission form the basis of the claim. Id. at 193, 162 A.2d at 832.
A minority of courts have held that the purchase of insurance constitutes a
waiver of immunity to the extent of the insurance coverage. By 1960, howevei,
twenty-one states had held that a public entity did not alter its tort immunity by
purchasing insurance and only three states had reached the contrary view. Annot.,
68 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1962). Since 1960, at least four states have joined the ranks of
the minority, showing an increasing approval of the view that the presence of insurance warrants avoidance of the governmental immunity doctrine. Christie v. Board
of Regents, 364 Mich. 202, 111 N.W.2d 30 (1961); Schoening v. United States Aviation
Underwriters, Inc., 120 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1963); Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C,
226 Ore. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961); Marshall v. City of Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118
N.W.2d 715 (1963). See generally David, Tort Liability of Local Government: Alternatives to Immunity From Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1, 47-53 (1959); Gibbons,
Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State and Local Government, 1959
DUKE L.J. 588. For a discussion of liability insurance and indemnification of officers
and employees as indirect methods of creating governmental liability, see DAvis § 25.04
(1958, Supp. 1963).
IMMUNITY
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bench as well as the bar. 5 Reinforced by growing acceptance of a
"spread-the-loss" philosophy," commentators have argued that public entities 7 should be held responsible for torts committed by their
8
employees within the scope of their employment.
Despite appeals for reform from the courts0 and commentators, 10
most state legislatures have failed to provide a satisfactory solution. 1
Within the last seven years, however, several courts have abolished
the governmental immunity doctrine by judicial fiat,1 2 and it seems
SSee, e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1961); Fuller & Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation,
54 HARv. L. REv. 437, 441-45 (1941); Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign
without Immunity, 36 So. CAL. L. REV. 161, 166-67 (1963); Seasongood, Municipal
Corporations:Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910
(1936).
6The "risk" theory of tort liability, exemplified by the workmen's compensation
acts, imposes liability without regard to fault, on the theory that persons injured should be compensated for their loss by distributing the costs over the
beneficiaries of the enterprise that created the risk. See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
STUDY 271-72; 2 HARPER & JAMES §§ 13.1-.8. The classical reason for condemning
governmental immunity has been that it places the burden of damage resulting from the wrongful acts of government on the injured rather than on the community. See Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1196 (1931). It has been argued that an "important
social objective would be attained by 'spreading the cost' of damages caused by governmental activities among all taxpayers who would ultimately bear the burdcn of
municipal tort liability." Note, 42 NEB. L. REv. 710, 715-16 (1963). Thus government

has been pointed to as being the ideal loss spreader. See

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY

272; 3 DAvis § 25.17, at 503; Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN.
L. REv. 751 (1956). But see Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at 176.
TThe terms public entities, government agencies, and political subdivisions are
used interchangeably in this comment in referring to all entities, such as states, counties, municipal corporations, townships, and school districts, which are considered
to be governmental in nature.
8See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2 (a) (Supp. 1963); CAL. LAw REVISION COhsas'N,
RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO

SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY-NUMBER

1-ToRT LIABILITY OF

puBLIc ENTITIES AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEEs 814-15 (1963); 3 DAVIS § 25.17, at 93 (Supp.
1963).
'See, e.g., Lee v. Dunklee, 84 Ariz. 260, 263-64, 326 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1958); Fette v.
City of St. Louis, 366 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Mo. 1963).
0oSee authorities cited note 1 supra.
A"Before the recent trend toward judicial abolition of governmental immunity,
Congress and the New York legislature were the only two governing bodies to have
enacted legislation making governmental entities liable to approximately the same
extent as a person or private corporation. See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60
Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); N.Y. CT. CL. Aar § 8.
As a reaction to the judicial abrogation of governmental immunity, the legislatures
of Illinois, California, and Minnesota have passed legislation affecting governmental
liability. See note 15 infra. Also, there have been indications that other legislatures
are considering action in this vital area. See, e.g., Comment, 16 MAINE L. REV. 209
(1964).
2 Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Muskopf V.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Hargrove
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likely that other courts will soon follow the same path. Although
the trend toward holding government responsible for its torts is commendable and justified, a strong caveat should be directed to courts
which have not yet undertaken judicial abrogation of the governmental immunity doctrine. An attempt is made in this comment to
isolate and clarify certain factors which a court should consider and
to suggest possible guidelines which a court should follow in formulating its decision when the abolition of governmental immunity
is urged upon it.
JUDICIAL ABROGATION

It is unfortunate that legislatures have not acted to provide an
adequate statutory replacement for the outdated doctrine of governmental immunity. The legislature, with its public forum and investigative machinery, is better equipped than the courts to outline
the desired scope of governmental liability. 13 A judicial decision
necessarily lacks the political comprehensiveness of a legislative
enactment, for the court must primarily address itself to a limited
fact situation. Furthermore, a court decree is usually retrospective
and affects rights established before the decision date. Thus, farreaching and uncertain consequences may result when judicial rather
than legislative abrogation is used.14 But since legislatures have not
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community
Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Williams v. City of Detroit, 864
Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961) (dictum); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,
118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962) (dictum); Rice v. Clark Co., 382 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1963);
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
The rationale which the courts have employed in asserting their power to abolish
the immunity doctrine is that, since the courts first created the rule, they can abolish
it without legislative action. See, e.g., Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, supra at 393,
881 P.2d at 113; Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., supra at 218, 359 P.2d at 461, 11 Cal.
Rptr. at 93.
13 See Rice v. Clark Co., supra note 12, at 613 (dissenting opinion); SovEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 267-330; Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy
Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 463 (1963); Comment, 6 Aiuz. L. Riv. 102, 108 (1964),
"I When the abrogating decision is considered in the light of the pre-existing law,
uncertainty as to desirable action can develop within the legislature and public
entities because of the difficulty in predicting the new areas of liability. See SovEREIGN
IMMUNITY STUDY 268 & n.3; Cobey, The New California Governmental Tort Liability
Statutes, 1 HARV. J. LEGIS. 16, 17-18 (1964); Herder, Judicial Legislation and the Doctrine of Governmental Immunity, 39 U. DET. L.J. 570, 581 (1962); Van Alstyne, supra
note 13, at 466-67; Note, The Tort Liability of Florida Municipal Corporations, 16 U.
FLA. L. RaV. 90, 101-03 (1963). In an attempt to inject certainty into the confusion
following the abrogating decisions, a number of state legislatures have enacted illuminating legislation. See note 15 infra.
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acted, and since it seems unlikely that they will act, the burden has
shifted to the courts to reach a proper result on a case-by-case basis.
The responsibility, therefore, falls upon the courts to consider
not only the cases before them, but to consider also the consequences of their decisions on future litigants and the public as a
whole. The court can best fulfill its role by enunciating a decision
which will serve as a catalyst to legislative action' 5 and as an interim
solution to the many problems which will undoubtedly arise due
to a change in a long established policy of governmental immunity.
Therefore, in formulating an abrogating opinion, the court should
be aware of the pitfalls and uncertainty encountered in most of the
jurisdictions which have already judicially abolished governmental
immunity. Furthermore, the court should include in the abrogating
opinion an indication as to how far it intends to extend governmental liability. Thus the bench must determine where the limits
of governmental responsibility should be drawn.
1

rPast experience indicates that judicial abrogation has been the most effective
way of prompting legislative action in this area. Three state legislatures have reacted
to judicial abrogation in their states by passing legislation in direct response to the
courts' decisions. In California, a moratorium period was created to give the legislature
time to study the problems caused by the court's decision. See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 22.3
(Supp. 1963). The 1963 session of the California legislature virtually rewrote the California law respecting governmental liability in tort on the recommendation of the
California Law Revision Commission. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815, 815.2, 830-31,
835, 844-46, 850, 854-56, 860, 911.2, 911.4, 915, 945, 945.2, 970-71, 975 (Supp. 1963);
Cobey, supra note 14. The Illinois legislature reacted to judicial abrogation by
restoring immunity to a number of activities and by providing a short statute of
limitations and monetary limit on recovery in actions against school districts. See ILL.
RFv. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (1961) (immunity restored to counties); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
57V2, § 3a (1961) (immunity restored to forest preserve districts); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 105, §§ 12.1-1, 491 (1961) (immunity restored to park districts); ILL. Rav. STAT.
ch. 105, § 333.2a (1961) (immunity restored to the Chicago Park District); ILL.
RI v. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 821-31 (1961) (short statute of limitations and $10,000 recovery
limit in actions against school districts); Comment, 9 DE PAUL L. REv. 39 (1959). In
Minnesota, the legislature responded to the court's abolition by passing legislation
which stated that political subdivisions, but not the state, would be liable in tort
with certain specified exceptions. The statute also provided for a monetary limit
on recovery against political subdivisions, a claim procedure and the purchasing of
insurance by governmental agencies. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.01-.17 (1963); The
Minnesota Supreme Court 1962-1963, 48 MINN. L. REv. 119, 198-203 (1963).
Anticipated legislative reaction is justifiably one of the motives behind decisions to
judicially abolish governmental immunity. See Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 464;
Note, 31 CINN. L. Ray. 307, 327 (1962). With the momentum of the trend to judicially
abolish governmental immunity behind them, courts will find it easier to overrule
their past precedents of governmental immunity and thereby shift the burden to
the legislature to provide a comprehensive guide to governmental responsibility.
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DELIMITING THE SCOPE OF GOVERNMENTAL

LIABILITY

Even the staunchest advocates of governmental responsibility
agree that tort immunity is needed in certain areas of governmental
activity. 16 Close scrutiny, moreover, will show that the legal principles of tort liability as related to private persons cannot readily
be transposed into the sphere of governmental activity.Y7 Public and
private entities are so significantly different that it would be unwise
to treat them exactly alike for tort purposes.
Distinctive Characteristicsof Governmental Liability
Government has an impact on the individual unlike that of any

other individual or business. Both in scope and variety, public
activities range far beyond those of private enterprise. State
and municipal highways, law making and enforcement, licensing

and permit issuing, and land use regulation are governmental
responsibilities which would be difficult, if not impossible, to
carry out without harm resulting to someone. Yet, because of their
broad scope and benefit to the community, it would be inadvisable in

many situations to burden public entities with absolute' s or vicarious"9 liability for all damages incurred. Fire protection and prevention, law enforcement, water and air pollution control, flood
10See, e.g., 3 DAvis § 25.11; Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J.
1 (1924). "Obviously the Administration cannot be held to the obligation of guaranteeing the citizen against all errors or defects, for life in an organized community requires
a certain number of sacrifices and even risks." Ibid.
17
SOVEREIGN IMtUNrrY STUDY 269-71; Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 468-70; see
Comment, 16 MAINE L. REV. 209, 216 (1964).
1" It has been suggested that governmental units may be the ideal loss spreader
"especially ... if its taxes are geared to ability to pay" and the public entity is "large
enough." See 3 DAvis § 25.17, at 503. This suggestion of "equitable loss spreading"
has been criticized by some commentators as not taking into consideration the practical
problems of government. See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at 176. Professor Davis
did recognize, however, that government should not be held liable for all the private
losses they cause. 3 DAvis § 25.17, at 504. If public entities were to be held liable for
all the harm resulting from their activities without regard to fault, it is doubtful that
they would be able to accomplish the ends for which they exist. See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 269; 3 DAvis § 25.17, at 501; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at 177; Van
Alstyne, supra note 13, at 468. Other commentators have felt that the suggestion of
"equitable loss spreading" merely serves to "underscore the fact that resolution of the
problem cannot intelligently be predicted upon theoretical concepts of the role of tort
law." Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 471; see SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 272.
10 See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 273; Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 472-91. The
individual governmental employee involved should be, and usually is, answerable to
the person wronged in most situations where the governmental unit should not be
held liable. See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 273.
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control, water and soil conservation, and public health functions
are a few examples of activities essential to the public welfare the
performance of which would become extremely onerous if government were held liable for all resulting harm.20 Therefore, it is
in relation to policy factors not necessarily present in cases between
private litigants that liability should be imposed on governmental
entities.

21

Moreover, a number of essential functions performed by governmental entities are so profitless or precarious that private enterprise
might not undertake them. 22 Furthermore, governmental entities
are required by law to render most of these services to the public
regardless of the risks involved; whereas, in most instances a private
entity may discontinue any activity when it becomes expedient to do
so. 23 Consequently, the public entity is exposed to greater risks
with less freedom of action by which to protect itself than is the
private entrepreneur. 24 Thus, while complete governmental immunity is generally regarded as being unjust, unlimited governmental
liability may not be the best alternative, especially when created by
a retrospective judicial decree. Rather, a mean is needed between
the extremes. Where this mean lies, however, is a subject of controversy among legal scholars, courts, and legislatures.
Locating the Mean
An attempt to solve the controversy over the limits of governmental liability should be aimed at identifying possible legal criteria
which would permit the loss spreading function of tort law to apply
to government without unduly frustrating the beneficial activities
concerned. 25 In order to delineate the boundaries of public responsibility, therefore, it is necessary not only to apply established concepts of tort law, but also to balance the public policy factors in20

See SOVEPEGN IMMUNITY STUDY 269; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at 177; Van

Alstyne, supra note 13, at 468.
21 For a discussion of the policy factors to be considered, see notes 29-34 supra and
accompanying text.
22 See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at 177.
23 See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 269; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at 177; Van
Alstyne, supra note 13, at 468.
2 SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 270; Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 469.
2n 3 DAvis § 29.17 (Supp. 1963, at 91); SovmEIN IMMUNITY STUDY 270, 293; Van
Alstyne, supra note 13, at 469, 472.
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volved. 26 Of course, the "fault ' '2 7 and "risk"28 concepts of tort
liability should be considered, but of paramount importance are
the policy factors peculiarly related to public entities which must
be evaluated and balanced. 29 Examples of the public policy factors to
be weighed are: whether public funds should be diverted to compensate for private injury; 30 whether there is a possibility of reduced
efficiency due to the fear of possible law suits; 31 whether the chance
of liability will encourage better safety precautions;32 whether the
injured, the governmental employee or the taxpayer should bear
the risk of loss; 33 and whether the beneficial ends of the particular
public activity involved will be unduly burdened.3 4
Although it is possible for the court to do this balancing on a
case-by-case basis, it is manifestly a legislative function to provide a
comprehensive solution after sufficient study.3 5 However, the court
may avoid a chaotic aftermath to its decision abrogating governmental immunity by stating in its opinion that it does not purport to
28 See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 272-73; Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 472.

" The "fault" theory of tort liability is the traditional concept that imposes liability
on the basis of "fault." See 2 HARPER & JAMEs §§ 12.1-A; SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY
271.
28 For a discussion of the "risk" theory of tort liability, see note 6 supra. The conflict between the "fault" and "risk" concepts in the area of public tort liability is
analyzed in David, Public Tort Liability Administration:Basic Conflicts and Problems,
9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 335, 337 (1942). "Although fault is still the dominant
rationale, various exceptions have developed and the tremendous growth of liability
insurance as a risk-distributing mechanism has tended to influence the practical administration of tort liability ... along lines characteristic not of the fault concept but of
the risk concept. In effect, modem tort law appears to consist of an amalgam of both
fault and risk theories, with steadily developing pressures in favor of extending the
latter approach." SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 272.
28 For a comprehensive balancing of these policy factors in various selected fact
situations, see SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 271-83; Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 470-532.
8' The need to protect public funds is the classical justification for governmental
immunity. See Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist., 348 Ill. App.
567, 575, 109 N.E.2d 636, 640 (1952).
11 This factor is most significant where discretionary decisions of governmental
officials are involved. See SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 246-60.
82 See Fuller & Casner, supra note 5, at 459-60.
22 Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 490.
24 For a more comprehensive evaluation of public policy factors involved in determining governmental immunity and liability, see 2 HARPER & JAMES § 29.3, at 1611-12
and authorities cited note 29 supra.
8r As Professor Van Alstyne observes, "a comprehensive statutory solution is badly
needed to give direction and bring some degree of consistency and uniformity to the
applicable statutory and common law principles." Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 465.
This is a task that no court of last resort could successfully carry out. See Rice v.
Clark Co., 382 P.2d 605, 612-13 (Nev. 1963) (dissenting opinion); Stanton, Sovereign
Immunity, 38 CAL. S.B.J. 177 (1963).
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abrogate governmental immunity completely, and by asking the
legislature to provide a comprehensive definition of the limits to
governmental liability after a thorough study of the situation.
Furthermore, the court can facilitate an easier transition by providing an interim solution that will establish predictable areas of
liability.
An Interim Solution
The court's interim solution should outline the extent to which
the court intends to hold public entities responsible in tort in the
absence of legislative pronouncements. It is suggested that the court
express an intent generally to hold all governmental bodies liable
in tort and then specify certain exceptions. Included in these exceptions should be harms generally considered non-tortious and
outside judicial inquiry, such as those caused by judicial, legislative,
quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative acts. 30 For damage resulting from

some discretionary acts and decisions neither governmental employees nor the public entities should be liable.3 7 A general rule of
discretionary immunity seems necessary to insure that official
decision making will not be impeded by the fear of direct or indirect reprisals. 38 Moreover, where governmental employees are given
immunity, as a general rule, the governmental employer should also
be immune from liability.39 A recent California decision 40 suggested

10See

Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 220, 359 P.2d 457, 462, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (1961); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 40, 115 N.W.2d
618, 625 (1962); 3 DAvis § 25.01 (Supp. 1963, at 79, 83).
17 See 3 DAvis § 25.13, at 489-91. This exception, however, should not be as broad
as under the "discretionary-ministerial" distinction discussed in note 3 supra. For suggested limitations on this exception, see SOVEREIGN IM NITY STUDY 273; Van Alstyne,
supra note 13, at 472-91.
"Even though in some cases the operation of the rule may result in harshness,
it is better, as Justice Learned Hand has contended, "to leave unredressed the wrongs
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation." Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949);
see Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 221, 359 P.2d 457, 462-63, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 94-95 (1961); SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 251; Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5,
at 180-81; Van Alstyne, supra note 13, at 478.
"O
California has codified such a provision in recent legislation. CAL. Gov'T CODE
§ 815.2 (b) (Supp. 1963); see CAL.. LAw REvisxON COMM'N, supra note 8, at 815. But see
3 DAWis § 25.17 (Supp. 1963, at 92-95). When the governmental employee is immune,
a strong factor in favor of extending immunity to his governmental employer is that
if the governmental agency were held liable the employee may fear indirect reprisals
from his employer. This fear of indirect reprisal would defeat the purposes for which
governmental employee immunity is given.
,0 Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 229-30, 359 P.2d 465,
467, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1961) (dictum).
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the possibility that in certain instances a governmental agency might
justifiably be held liable even though its employee was immune,
but the legislature acted to provide that in such a situation public
entities would not be liable in the absence of statutory enactment. 41
Obviously, since legislative intent supercedes judicial fiat in this
area, courts should enforce governmental immunity where preexisting statutory limitations on governmental liability have been
established. 42 Finally, the court should reassure public entities that
each case is to be viewed in relation to the public policy factors
involved in each individual situation.
Of course, this judicial expression will be dictum and not binding
on the court. Thus a change in personnel or shift in a justice's
thinking may lead to a deviation from the standards specified. Even
so, the interim solution should help to remove a dark cloud of unpredictability and provide public entities the guidelines with which
to plan fiscal policies until the state legislature has had a chance to
render a comprehensive statutory plan. Moreover, the legislature
will not be forced to make a hasty decision but will be able to give
the problem the sufficient study that it requires.
FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS
The preceding discussion has dealt with the courts' role in determining areas of substantive governmental liability. Before any final
conclusions can be drawn, however, the fiscal results which might
flow from the abrogation of tort immunity should be considered,
along with any possible legal devices which the court might use to
soften the effect of its decision.
Uniqueness of Public Funds

Public funds allocated to a governmental agency are based on
anticipated expenditures and are limited to the revenue which the
,1 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2 (b) (Supp. 1963); see CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra
note 8, at 815-16, 838. The California legislature has been advised to provide that a'
public entity may be held liable for malicious prosecution or the discretionary act of
an employee in selecting or failing to discipline a subordinate even though the responsible employee is immune. See CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 8, at 838,
841. Thus the California legislature, under the guidance of the Law Revision Commission, will determine where further liability of public entities will extend when the
responsible employee is immune. Such a situation lends certainty where the Lipman
decision left uncertainty. However, Professor Davis has criticized this approach; he
feels a "closed end" type statute freezes the law in areas where courts can make a
worthwhile contribution. 3 DAvis § 25.17 (Supp. 1963, at 95-97).
42 See Comment, Sovereign Immunity in Colorado, and the Feasibility of Judicial
Abrogation, 35 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 529, 552 (1963).
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public entity raises from taxes and assessments or receives under appropriations from a larger public entity. The proponents of continued governmental immunity point to the disastrous effects which
liability might have on these limited funds.43 However, Judge
David, among others, has shown that this fear is not entirely warranted and can be avoided through commercial insurance and other
loss spreading techniques. 44 Even the burden on small municipalities, where the danger of a large verdict is said to invite bankruptcy,
45
has been shown to be exaggerated.

Although the fear of catastrophic liabilities has been overemphasized, the unique character of public funds should be considered by a court in drafting its decision. In preparing their fiscal
policies, governmental agencies may have relied on tort immunity.
Therefore, courts should allow the public entities time in which to
re-evaluate their fiscal policies and prepare to meet their new responsibilities through insurance or additional revenue appropriations.
ProspectiveAbolition
One of the most useful devices available to delay the impact of
judicial abrogation of tort immunity is prospective abolition. Prospective abolition of outmoded rules of law has been approved by a
number of authorities, 4 including the Supreme Court in Great No.
Ry. v. Sunburst Oil 6- Ref. Co. 47 The so-called Sunburst doctrine
has been rejuvenated with the trend toward overruling charitable
and governmental tort immunity.48 Governmental immunity is
peculiarly adaptable to the device of prospective abolition. Through
this device, the outmoded law can be reformed without denying to
public entities the necessary time to provide insurance or other
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STUDY 288; Warp, Tort Liability Problems of Small
CONTEMP. PROB. 363 (1942).
"See David, supra note 4, at 8-14. But see Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at
169-72. Insurance, official bonds, installment payment of judgments, bond issues, and
statutory limits on tort recovery against public entities are a few of the suggested alternatives to warrant against a detrimental effect on public funds. See SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY STUDY 288-306; David, supra note 4, at 8-14, 45-53, 53-54; Fuller & Casner,
supra note 5, at 450, 460. But see Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at 178.
"1Warp, supra note 43.
"See generally Levy, Realist Jurisprudenceand Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA.
L. R.v. 1 (1960); Note, Prospectively Overruling the Common Law, 14 SYRAcUsE L.
REv. 53, 58 (1962); 16 Anx. L. REv. 289-92 (1962).
17 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
18 See Note, Prospectively Overruling the Common Law, 14 Svi~cus- L. REv. 53,
58 (1962).
43See

Municipalities, 9 LAw &
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revenue protection. Moreover, public funds are protected from a
possible flood of judgments based on claims not yet barred by the
statute of limitations. Finally, the arguable injustice of a retrospective decree, which in effect would penalize public entities for
their reliance on the court's previous statements of the law, is
avoided.4 9
Delaying the effective date of the decision is another useful device, closely related to prospective abolition, which not only provides a period of adjustment for governmental agencies, but also
encourages the legislature to act. If the state legislature is in or near
session, the court may invite legislative reaction by delaying the
effective date of the decision until after the adjournment of
session, thus subjecting its holding to any action the legislature
should take with regard to governmental immunity. This procedure was used in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist.50 to effec-

tively stimulate the Minnesota legislature into redrawing the limits
of governmental liability.51 Thus, as to the limits of the court's
abrogation, the Minnesota court avoided the period of chaos and uncertainty that has existed in other states between judicial abro52
gation and legislative reaction.

By the selective use of prospective abolition it will be possible
to make an orderly transition from governmental immunity to governmental liability and pave the way for constructive legislative
action. However, when prospective abolition is used, an exception
should be made for the plaintiff in the case at bar.53 By holding the
1"See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 28-29,
163 N.E.2d 89, 97-98 (1959); Comment, 6 ARiz. L. REv. 102, 105 (1964).
50264 Minn. 279, 281, 292-93, 118 N.W.2d 795, 796, 803-4 (1962).
"See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 466.01-.17 (1963); The Minnesota Supreme Court 1962-63,
48 MINN L. REv. 119, 198-203 (1963).
52 Compare Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Wis. 1962), where
the decision was made effective forty days in the future. The stated purpose of the
court was to give municipalities time to make financial arrangements to meet the new
liability implicit in their holding. Ibid.; see Note, supra note 48, at 60.
3 See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26-27, 163
N.E.2d 89, 97-98 (1959); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Wis.
1962). Moreover, it seems equitable that the persons injured in the same cause of
action as the plaintiff should likewise not be barred from recovery. As to these persons, the proximity of their causes of action to the plaintiff's, the possibility that they
were merely awaiting the outcome of the plaintiff's "test" case before pressing their
claims, and the limited number of possible claimants involved outweigh the policy
factors concerned in prospective abolition. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist. No. 302, 24 Ill. 2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962); Note, Prospectively Overruling the
Common Law, 14 SYRtcusE L. REv. 53, 58-59 (1962).
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defendant liable, the court's abolition of governmental immunity
will be binding precedent and not mere dictum. Moreover, the
plaintiff will receive the benefit from his time and money spent in
urging the overruling of governmental immunity. Such a policy will
give future plaintiffs incentive to appeal bad precedent. 4
CONCLUSION

Judicial abolition of the governmental immunity doctrine is
warranted in order to press legislative machinery into operation.
In its abrogating opinion, the court should balance the public policy
factors involved on a case-by-case basis and attempt to establish an
interim solution as to the limits of governmental liability. The objectives of such a solution should be to provide a workable framework which will instill confidence within public entities and the
legislature, thus facilitating a climate in which an orderly, comprehensive legislative solution can grow. Furthermore, it is the court's
responsibility to reduce the impact of its decision on the fiscal resources of public entities. This can best be done by a selective use of
the flexible and workable device of prospective abolition.
1'See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 28, 163
N.E.2d 89, 97 (1959).

